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“No one that ever lived ever
thought so crooked as we”: Endgame
According to Adorno
Philippe Birgy
1 Adorno’s  essay  “Trying  to  Understand  Endgame”  deals  with  the  limits  of  rational
understanding. According to the philosopher, explaining the unexplainable was more
or less the project of the Enlightenment. It rested on the belief that all phenomena
could be neatly circumscribed as a series of objects lending themselves to inquiry and
that the knowledge thus obtained would constantly reinforce one’s sense of mastery
over them. In the process, pure reason had to sever itself from nature and forcefully
dispel the obscurity around it in order to assert itself, erasing in the process the many
shades of blackness and grayness that lay out there, the many nuances that were so
important to Beckett. In other words, a great deal was thus left in ignorance since the
world was thereby reduced to what could be rationally thought about it:
Enlightenment,  understood  in  the  widest  sense  as  the  advance  of  thought,  has
always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.
Yet the wholly enlightened earth radiates under the sign of triumphant calamity
(Adorno 2002, 1).
2 This  “calamity”  or  “disaster”  (an  alternative  translation  of  the  German  term)  is
obviously  a  reference  to  a  historical  predicament.  The  Second  World  War  was  a
threshold  in  modernity,  and  in  Adorno’s  work,  the  name  “Auschwitz”  stands  as  a
metonymy  for  this  threshold.  It  designates  the  crumbling  of  the  whole  edifice  of
knowledge  predicated  upon  reason  that  had  been  erected  throughout  the  past
centuries.  By  the  same  token,  it  also  precluded  any  artistic  project  that  aimed  at
aesthetic  perfection. Consequently,  “Understanding  Endgame”  would  be  playing  into
the hands of the Enlightenment thinkers―that we all are, somehow. It would just be
the same recipe for “disaster”.
3 On the face of it, these very general notions, which may be derived from Adorno’s more
theoretical works, The Dialectics of Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics, seem to justify
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the systematic rejection of any philosophical discourse on Beckett’s play. They hold
that the project of the Enlightenment has encountered a major setback with the great
upsurge of irrationality of the Second World War which has forced us to reconsider its
“grand narrative”.  Or  so  reads the vulgarized digest  of  Adorno’s  argumentation,  as
exposed in these theoretical pieces of work. And indeed there is much, in Adorno’s
essay “Trying to Understand Endgame” that reminds us of these general statements.1 It
must be noted that adopting that premise brings us into alignment with a supposedly
coherent  post-modern  strand  of  criticism  vaguely  understood  as  the  practice  of
universal suspicion towards “meta-narratives” Yet Adorno and Hockheimer’s point in
The Dialectics of Enlightenment is that it is rationality itself, the triumph of reason, which
is irrational. And Clov and Hamm seem to bring grist to Adorno’s mill when they try to
comment on their own predicament:
CLOV (sadly): No one that ever lived ever thought so crooked as we. 
HAMM: We do what we can. 
CLOV: We shouldn’t. (Pause.) 
HAMM: You’re a bit of all right, aren’t you? 
CLOV: A smithereen. (Pause.) 
HAMM: This is slow work. (11)
4 Certainly,  the  explicit  content  of  their  exchange  is  the  admission  of  their  own
senselessness.  But  insofar  as  theatricality  is  concerned,  the  flaw  that  evidently
undermines  the  characters’  attempt  at  reasoning,  the  inconclusiveness  of  their
exchange of lines, is in inverse proportion to their talent for repartee. As Adorno puts
it, “The drama attends carefully to what kind of sentence might follow another. Given
the accessible spontaneity of such questions, the absurdity of content is all the more
strongly  felt”  (Adorno  1982,  140).  Idiomatism  seems  to  be  the  rule  of  their  verbal
exchange. The lines, when added up, do not constitute any sort of argument. Hamm
and Clov are “empty personae through which the world truly can only resonate”. What
remains of the mind, which “originated in mimesis” is “only ridiculous imitation” so
that the characters react ”behaviouristically“ (Adorno 1982, 128). It is the ”universal
law of clichés“2 which applies, that is: the fossilization of language into a culture that
after  having  been  turned  into  a  commodity, has  eventually  become  residual.  The
protagonists’ dialogue is indeed a series of conventional phrases, one programmatically
calling  for  the  other,  a  play  on  language  that  valorizes  the  letter  rather  than  the
meaning, yet one whose ceaseless rebounding produces puzzling results. And these in
turn inevitably foster the temptation to interpret them.
HAMM: Nature has forgotten us. 
CLOV: There’s no more nature. 
HAMM: No more nature! You exaggerate. 
CLOV: In the vicinity. 
HAMM: But we breathe, we change! We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! Our
ideals! 
CLOV: Then she hasn’t forgotten us. 
HAMM: But you say there is none. (10)
5 Here,  the only function of Clov’s first  rejoinder seems to be the invalidation of the
preceding statement. After which he retreats with a caveat which substantially reduces
the bearing of what he has just affirmed. For his part, Hamm eloquently retorts with
the empirical  evidence of  tangible  physicality.  But  the short  list  of  body parts  and
functions he cites as examples is prolonged by the vaguer and more aesthetic “bloom”
and eventually the very abstract “ideals.” So that, implicitly, these notions are set on
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the  same  plane  as  the  biological  organs.  And  as  these  “ideals”  materialize,  they
necessarily lose much of their notional or conceptual tenor. After all, the artistic idiom
is supposed to supply a more visceral expression of whatever cannot be set out in plain
and accurate technical language, so as to make it more palpable. According to common
sense,  Art  supplements  the  language  of  Science,  allowing  Man  to  complete  his
exploration  of  the  world.  But  in  Hamm’s  answer,  the  spirituality  of  “bloom”  and
“ideals” has evaporated and there is not much left of this enterprise of clarification.
Besides, the seemingly optimistic tone of Hamm aimed at relativizing and correcting
Clov’s  affirmation  eventually  becomes  a  dysphoric  assessment  of  bodily  decay,
although the tone remains celebratory, deepening the gap between form and content.
All  content  of  subjectivity,  which  necessarily  hypostatizes  itself,  is  trace  and
shadow of the world, from which it withdraws in order not to serve that semblance
and conformity the world demands (Adorno 1982, 127).
6 Eventually, in the two last lines of the excerpt quoted above, contradiction closes upon
itself at both ends, so to speak, in the sense that the antithetical formulations of the
characters  are  both  negations  of  the  respective  statements  they  have  so  learnedly
pronounced before.
The  logical  figure  of  the  absurd,  which  makes  the  claim  of  stringency  for
stringency’s contradictory opposite,  denies every context of meaning apparently
guaranteed by logic, in order to prove logic’s own absurdity. (Adorno 1982, 141)
7 The possibility of meaningful statements fleetingly becomes a subject of comedy, but
the fun is not much fun.
Psychoanalysis  explains  clownish  humor  as  a  regression  back  to  a  primordial
ontogenetic  level,  and  Beckett’s  regressive  play  descends  to  that  level.  But  the
laughter  it  inspires  ought  to  suffocate  the  laughter.  That  is  what  happened  to
humour after it became―as an aesthetic medium―obsolete, repulsive, devoid of
any canon of what can be laughed at; without any place for reconciliation, where
one could laugh. (Adorno 1982, 134)
8 Again,  in  the  following series  of  lines,  a  distinction is  made between meaning and
interpretation:
HAMM: Clov! 
CLOV (impatiently): What is it? 
HAMM: We’re not beginning to... to... mean something? 
CLOV: Mean something! You and I, mean something! (Brief laugh.) Ah that’s a good
one! 
HAMM: I wonder. (Pause.) Imagine if a rational being came back to earth, wouldn’t
he be liable to get ideas into his head if  he observed us long enough. (Voice of
rational being.) Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I understand what they’re
at! (Clov starts, drops the telescope and begins to scratch his belly with both hands.
Normal voice.) And without going so far as that, we ourselves... (with emotion)...we
ourselves... at certain moments... (Vehemently.) To think perhaps it won’t all have
been for nothing! (22)
9 Hamm cannot  go  as  far  as  positing  an interpreter  who would regulate  and impart
significance to his verbal exchanges with Clov. Such a return to rationality cannot be
conceived  of,  for  it  would  constitute  a  future,  and  that  is  definitely  far  too
presumptuous and frightening for  the character.  But  at  least  he may entertain the
possibility that their own words might just have some immanent meaning, that is: some
significance in themselves in spite of their apparent platitude and inanity for those who
utter them. The evocation of that second possibility seems enough to comfort Hamm.
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10 As  for  the  hypothesis  that  a  “rational  being”might  decipher  their  gibberish,  thus
conferring meaning on it, that is surely a flight of fancy, and it is treated in the parodic
mode,  parody  being,  according  to  E.  Angel-Perez  and  A.  Poulain,  one  of  the  only
available options if one wants to “reinstate the concepts of the humanistic world of
yore” (119).
11 Now, for Adorno, if an updated humanistic project may still be envisaged, it must be
redesigned  from  the  ground  up.  One  can  definitely  not  resume  the  enterprise  of
clarification  and  exhaustive  description  of  the  universe  that  safely  dissociated  the
knowing subject from the known world. Or else, it must certainly be a joke. Already, in
the  preceding  quote,  the  brief  laughter  of  Hamm  is  dissociated  from  any idea  of
enjoyment or exultation, not to mention the plenitude of happiness. Hamm’s laughter
resembles  the  compulsory  and  self-serving  “fun”  of  anomic  societies.  “[E]ven  the
remaining trace of silly, sophistic rationality is wiped away. The only comical thing
remaining is that along with the sense of the punchline, comedy itself has evaporated”
(Adorno 1982, 135).
12 As we have repeatedly stressed, the whole Enlightenment enterprise was disastrous,
according to Adorno, because its triumph was achieved at the cost of our separation
from the natural world. Our scientific detachment has excluded us from it. And, having
alienated ourselves from Nature,  the latter escaped us even more,  becoming in the
process a source of fears and anxieties.
13 Certainly, this description connects well with the formulae of despair or insignificance
which are brandished triumphantly by Hamm and Clov, with their insistence that there
must be nothing outside because whatever appears on the horizon is a threat, their
affirmation that the worst is the best, and that, entrenched as they are and secured
against any irruption of nature, hope would be dangerous.
CLOV (anguished, scratching himself): I have a flea! 
HAMM: A flea! Are there still fleas? 
CLOV: On me there’s one. (Scratching.) Unless it’s a crab louse. 
HAMM (very perturbed): But humanity might start from there all over again! Catch
him, for the love of God! (22)
14 The  shortened  line  of  reasoning  that  Hamm  offers  as  a  justification  for  the
extermination of the flea (“Humanity might start from there...”) does not explain why
he  takes  it  upon  himself  to  prevent  the  development  of  natural  life.  It  is  soon
contradicted by another exchange, where Clov has appropriated his master’s argument
(“A potential creator?”) while Hamm seems to have renounced it. Yet again he exposes
a logical counter-argument which proves equally faulty and leaves Clov’s proposition
unaltered (“And if he doesn’t...”).
Let’s see. (He moves the telescope.) Nothing...  nothing...  good...  good...  nothing...
goo— (He starts, lowers the telescope, examines it, turns it again on the without.
Pause.) Bad luck to it! 
HAMM:  More  complications!  (Clov  gets  down.)  Not  an  underplot,  I  trust.  (Clov
moves ladder nearer window, gets up on it, turns telescope on the without.) 
CLOV (dismayed): Looks like a small boy! 
HAMM (sarcastic): A small... boy! 
CLOV: I’ll go and see. (He gets down, drops the telescope, goes towards door, turns.)
I’ll take the gaff. (He looks for the gaff, sees it, picks it up, hastens towards door.) 
HAMM: No! (Clov halts.) 
CLOV: No? A potential procreator? 
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HAMM: If he exists he’ll die there or he’ll come here. And if he doesn’t... (Pause.) 
CLOV: You don’t believe me? You think I’m inventing? (Pause.) (46)
15 On the one hand, as Adorno notes, such permutations prevent us from grasping Hamm
and Clov as individuals but rather encourage us to view them as the parts of a same
dramatic entity. “Even the outlines of Hamm and Clov are one line, they are denied the
individuation of  a  tidily independent monad.  They cannot live without each other”
(Adorno 1982, 144).
16 On  the  other  hand,  the  anthropomorphic  illusion  of  independent  characters  is
dispelled,  the  coherence  and  integrity  of  the  individual  atomized  into  isolated
repartees. The only observable line that circumscribes a locus of identity is the contour
of the body which is neither the seat of organized thoughts nor the site of intentional
action.
For the time being, the historical crisis of the individual runs up against the single
biological being, its arena. The succession of situations in Beckett,  gliding along
without resistance from individuals, thus ends with those obstinate bodies which
have regressed. (Adorno 1982, 134)
17 It  must  be  added  that  the  said  bodies,  identifiable  as  a  conglomerate  of  matter,  a
functional  system of  organ or  machinery,  are  in  a  process  of  decay,  their  internal
connections partly dismantled.
As soon as the subject is no longer doubtlessly self-identical,  no longer a closed
structure of meaning, the line of demarcation with the exterior becomes blurred,
and the situations of inwardness become at the same time a physical one. (Adorno
1982, 129)
18 Of course, whether the characters can be said to comment “explicitly” or “deliberately”
on their predicament, once we have interpreted their speech through the lens of some
philosophical system, is mere psychologizing. As a general rule, ascribing any measure
of deliberation to characters is certainly a dubious critical move. But crediting the play
or the author with any illustrative intention is even more suspicious for it would either
imply a case of prophetic or intuitive reconstitution of Beckett’s line of thought (by
Adorno, in this case), or else two concurrent formulations of the same condition of the
world.3 However, Adorno insists that Beckett’s theatre is not the reconstitution of a line
of thought. Any attempt at having the characters or the play as a whole expose or enact
the beliefs of the author would not satisfy Adorno’s conditions for a genuinely critical
literature.
19 Tentatively  acknowledging  his  debt  to Hegel,  the  philosopher  practices  a  form  of
dialectic which refutes the secondary, purely illustrative, nature of the example and
argues  that  it  is  not  the  playwright’s  role  to  make  a  stand.  The  artwork  must
mimetically conform to and confuse itself with what it is about, what it “presents”4 to
the spectator. For it is only by being like what it imitates that art can object to it.
20 Those who find fault with the vulgarized form of anti-foundationalism which is said to
serve  as  a  culture  in  postwar  Europe,  may  indeed  conclude  that  Endgame exactly
exposes the untenable consequences of a hypothetical disappearance of meaning in a
supposedly post-modern regime where anything goes, where one thing is just as good
as another, where nothing holds and there is nothing to choose from, because nothing
has any worth. Consequently, it is all the same, it is all one, it is worthless.5 Again, the
characters’ words, or lack of them, seem to reflect that post-war condition:
HAMM (violently): Wait till you’re spoken to! (Normal voice.) All is... all is... all is
what? (Violently.) All is what? 
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CLOV: What all is? In a word? Is that what you want to know? Just a moment. (He
turns  the  telescope  on  the  without,  looks,  lowers  the  telescope,  turns  towards
Hamm.) Corpsed. (Pause.) Well? Content? 
HAMM: Look at the sea. 
CLOV: It’s the same. (20)
21 Now, the absurdity of generalization is certainly enacted in such passages of the play,
but it is impossible to tell whether the scene disqualifies it as an untenable premise or
confirms the impossibility of such generalizations. If anyone had the final word on the
state of the universe,  that word would be “corpsed”.  But Clov’s comment is  “just a
moment” in a dynamic theatrical sequence. His histrionic behaviour is plainly a parody
of  scientific  observation,  involving  deduction  and  induction.  After  scrutinizing  the
objects that constitute the external world, he pretends to derive a universal statement
from  this  study.  Yet  the  rhetorical  function  of  his  answer  is  apparent  from  his
preoccupation with Hamm’s reaction (“Well? Content?”). Indeed, Hamm does not rest
content. And his unrest precisely manifests what remains of life within him. And the
same  is  also  true  of  his  companion.  Conversely,  content  or  contentedness  would
precisely describe that quality of the objects whose life has been extinguished. As for
the  rest,  observation  and  deduction  are  just  a  variation,  a  phase  or  phrase  in  a
composition that spans a wider range of tones and intensities. Hamm presses on with
his questions, and Clov’s affirmation on similitude or identity proves inconclusive for it
relies on comparison. And comparison requires a reference point to assess and measure
the resemblance between one thing and another and eventually prove them to be the
same: it calls for a second term which is conspicuously absent in the passage.
22 All  in  all,  Clov’s  and Hamm’s  pessimism is  only  raised by  the  force  of  a  solipsistic
enthusiasm.6 But mostly, Endgame is nothing but that presentation of the habitual. The
situations that Beckett dramatizes do not detract or add anything to the presentation
of a modern condition, and least of all do they comment upon such a state of things. It
may be that Beckett pushes the situation to its reasonable “conclusion”, which is that it
is inconclusive. Perhaps he even does it with a measure of exaggeration. But mostly, the
playwright lets the situation speak for itself. Yet in the final analysis, there is more to it
than  strict  presentation  because  this  mimesis appears  to  us  as  untenable,  it
compromises, unsettles and harms what it presents. For Adorno insists on the necessity
of a commitment to the world in the artistic process. This commitment cannot assume
the form of a didactic or expository discourse―the illustration or dramatization of an
idea.  Neither can art  subscribe to the dictates of  realism, the “pure” or “accurate”
representation of reality. For in both cases, the artist would impose an interpretative
order on reality. Yet if Art consequently dissociates itself from reality and exists for its
own sake, then what remains of its commitment? Art, then, is unavoidably caught in
this double bind (Adorno 1980).
23 The historicist hypothesis from which we started, that of a breaking point which would
make it impossible to narrate a story after the Second World War does not summarize
the practical  import  of  Adorno’s  approach.  The philosopher recommends a  method
which is far removed from any generalization based on the systematic application of a
theory. It equally denies that Beckett’s play might have any illustrative function and
refutes the so-called antinomy between theory and practice. The elements of Hegelian
dialectics  that  still  obtain  in  Adorno’s  line  of  thought  imply  quite  precisely  that  a
particular example never ceases to be an example just because it exemplifies something
else:  its  exemplary nature belongs with it.  This singularity may be understood as a
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postmodern trait in the sense that it posits an irreducible pluralism, a pure difference
that does not lend itself to any of the categorizations induced by language. Thus it does
not allow any game of substitution. Indeed, partial objects in Endgame blatantly fail to
replace what they stand for. The unfinished toy-dog fulfils no function as a substitute.
The same comment applies to the last child which could presumably symbolize a hope
for mankind, or even the last flea or the last rat. The seeds that have not sprouted are
also offered as experimental proof that no renewal is possible. In all these cases, the
possibility  of  generalizing  a  particular  experience  to  a  whole  class  of  comparable
objects remains unconvincing.
24 We may also hear in the characters’ absurd retorts the avowal that such generalizations
do not tell us anything about the world (“All is, all is...”), and that what is iterated and
repeats itself is language, exclusively. It is always the same story, the same play that
plays itself out. The characters cannot leave the scenic enclosure for they only exist in
this restricted perimeter. The singular presence of objects, the physical evidence of the
body and the limited movements of the characters, all this raw dramatic material is
detached from the language of the stage.7 And their passive existence is all there is to
them.
25 Adorno’s declarations on this subject are unambiguous. He rarely discusses at length
any possible interpretation of this or that symbol (say, the dustbin or the wheelchair)
but  restricts  his  observations  to  what  there  is  on  stage:  a  couple  of  dustbins,  two
windows that do not open on any imaginable beyond, a painting that may represent an
identifiable personage, although we can’t see it. In short, nothing that could contribute
to an overall “theoretical” perception of the play. The objection that Adorno interprets
facts through the prism of the theory of “the end of history” simply does not take into
account  the  details  of  his  essay,  and  this  against  Adorno’s  own suggestion  that  in
Beckett’s work, it is the persistence of the details that counts most.
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NOTES
1. For instance: “In Endgame, a historical moment is revealed, the experience which was cited in
the title  of  the culture industry’s  rubbish book Corpsed.  After  the Second War,  everything is
destroyed, even resurrected culture, without knowing it;  humanity vegetates along, crawling,
after events which even the survivors cannot really survive, on a pile of ruins which renders
futile self-reflection of one’s own battered state” (Adorno 1982, 122).
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2. “Communication, the universal law of clichés, proclaims that there is no more communication.
The  absurdity  of  all  speaking  is  not  unrelated  to  realism  but  rather  develops  from  it.  For
communicative language postulates―already in its syntactic form, through logic, the nature of
conclusions, and stable concepts―the principle of sufficient reason.” Adorno 1982, 139.
3. This position corresponds to the first of the three options proposed in the introduction to this
volume.
4. Bearing  in  mind  the  particular  meaning  that  Badiou  ascribes  to  the  word  (Badiou  1988,
193-211.)
5. Badiou offers  a  description of  that  ideological  consensus  :  “La  cible  d’Adorno est  donc la
fonction du principe d’identité dans le rationalisme occidental et, par conséquent, la suspicion à
l’égard  de  l’universalisme  en  ce  que  ce  dernier  est  justement  l’imposition  de  l’Un,  soit  une
imposition identitaire selon laquelle une chose peut valoir pour tous ou, en d’autres termes, la
réduction de tous au semblable en tant que le semblable est cette prescription universelle. À ce
titre,  Adorno anticipe avec vingt ans d’avance des thèmes devenus absolument ordinaires de
l’idéologie contemporaine. On trouve des passages d’Adorno à vrai dire un peu sophistiqués (ce
n’est pas un écrivain léger…) mais qui aujourd’hui sont omniprésents dans les journaux, comme
en  témoigne  cet  extrait  :  ‘c’est  justement  l’insatiable  principe  d’identité  qui  éternise
l’antagonisme en opprimant ce qui est contradictoire. Ce qui ne tolère rien qui ne soit pareil à
lui-même, contrecarre une réconciliation pour laquelle il se prend faussement. La violence du
rendre-semblable reproduit la contradiction qu’elle élimine’. Les thèmes conjoints de la nécessité
de  l’évaluation  des  différences,  du  respect  de  l’altérité,  du  caractère  criminel  de  la  non-
considération de l’identité, de la volonté nécessairement violente de la similitude universelle,
etc., sont des thèmes fondamentaux dans toute la Dialectique négative d’Adorno” (Badiou 2005).
6. To be more accurate, the "state of affairs" affecting the modern world having reached the
critical  moment of  its  modernity,  its  untenable  climax would be the demise  of  all  claims to
universality (except the universality of relativism). Conversely, we should reserve the term post-
modernism to describe its joyous embrace of everything fragmentary, its affectation of effortless
mastery in the face of uncontrollable events. In Halward’s words, Badiou’s Beckett “reduces the
function of joy to its breathless affirmation” (Hall 201).
7. This language is not only made up of the speeches of the characters, but it also includes the
text  of  the  play,  with  its  supposed intentionality,  its  organization  and the  stylistic  traits  or
principles that can be derived from its observation.
ABSTRACTS
Adorno’s essay “Trying to Understand Endgame” has had a large and enduring influence in the
field of Beckettian study. Yet because of its banalization, it is now often assumed that Adorno’s
historical  argument  is  an  interpretative  grid  applied  to  the  play  from  without  and  that  it
consequently fails  to account for Endgame’s  essentially theatrical  nature.  The purpose of  this
article is to retrace the philosopher’s line of thought in the above-mentioned essay, trying to
show  that,  contrary  to  a  very  common  opinion,  Adorno  proves  himself  to  be  particularly
conscious of the physical, oral, visual and, more generally, perceptive dimension of the play.
L’essai d’Adorno “Pour comprendre Fin de partie” a eu un impact considérable et durable dans le
champ des études beckettiennes. Mais en raison de sa banalisation, on tient souvent pour acquis
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aujourd’hui que l’argument historiciste d’Adorno est une grille interprétative appliquée sur la
pièce de l’extérieur, et qu’en conséquence, il ne rend pas compte de la nature essentiellement
théâtrale de Fin de partie. Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de retracer les grandes lignes de
la pensée du philosophe dans l’essai cité plus haut, afin de montrer que contrairement à une
opinion fort répandue, Adorno s’attache tout particulièrement aux dimensions physiques, orales,
visuelles, et plus généralement perceptives de la pièce.
INDEX
Mots-clés: fin de partie, historicisme, philosophie, postmoderne, réalité, représentation,
théâtralité
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